Legislative Television as an Institutional Entry Barrier: The Impact of C-SPAN2 on Turnover in the U.S. Senate, 1946–1998

Abstract

The present study examines the impactof televised U.S. Senate sessions (byC-SPAN2) on turnover rates in the U.S.Senate over the period 1946–1998. Using atheoretical model wherein politicalservices are viewed as search/experiencegoods, it is argued that there are manyparliamentary procedures available to U.S.Senators (e.g., filibustering, SpecialOrder Speeches, etc.) that serve them aslow-cost forms of persuasive advertising. These outlets provide opportunities forpolitical ``grandstanding'' on popular issueswhich challengers would have to spend largesums of money to combat and/or replicate. In this way C-SPAN (potentially) servesincumbent Senators as an entry barrier.