Abstract
We offer a general model of policy making across presidential systems, exploring how checks and balances interact with legislative party systems to determine the responsiveness of political systems to electoral change. Using the two dominant theories of policy making in the United States as a starting point, we formally model the legislative process across presidential regimes characterized by a wide array of institutional designs, simulate expected policy behavior, and then test our models empirically with data capturing economic policy choices. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
