Legislative oversight and executive aggrandisement in the Nigeria’s COVID-19 emergency governance

Abstract

ABSTRACT The COVID-19 Pandemic has compelled governments across nations of the world to devise and implement emergency measures for curtailing the spread of the lethal virus. A fundamental debate is the relevance of legislature’s involvement in the emergency decision-making and the extent to which this representative assembly is able to assert its oversight role by making the government accountable to the public in emergency governance. Nigeria, like many other nations across the globe, has called upon government emergency powers to deal with the pandemic. This paper examines the imperative of legislative oversight of emergency governance and interrogates the extent to which the legislature has been able to monitor, control and make government accountable to the public in the COVID-19 emergency response in Nigeria. The study which is qualitative, relied heavily on secondary data and adopted a systematic literature review for data collection and analysis. Findings revealed the limited legislative oversight of government’s emergency declarations for dealing with the pandemic which further perpetuated executive dominance in the governance process of Nigeria. The invocation of the Quarantine Act of 1929 by the President instead of its state of emergency powers, the latter which constitutionally requires legislature’s oversight, and the subsequent issuing of COVID-19 regulations, portrays executive aggrandisement. The relegation of the legislative oversight in the use of emergency powers for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic enhances executive dominance and undermines the democratic principles of checks and balances with its concomitant implications for accountability, inclusivity and democratic legitimacy required in emergency governance.