Legislative form as a justification for legislative supremacy

Abstract

Defenders of legislative supremacy against judicial review have primarily invoked various virtues of legislative process – in particular, its deliberative qualities, the diverse perspectives and inputs it allows, and especially, its connection to a principle of democratic equality. However, I argue that such virtues have been overemphasised as justifications for legislative supremacy. Instead, I argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the form of legislation as a justification for giving legislatures the ‘final say’ on issues of fundamental rights. Firstly, I argue that legal philosophy has underemphasised the extent to which legislative form, rather than legislative process, can mediate ‘majoritarian’ rule, and how this undermines the most commonplace arguments for rights-based judicial review of parliamentary legislation. Secondly, I suggest that the same formal attributes give legislation a virtue of political transparency which can be contrasted with the esotericism of constitutional jurisprudence, itself considered as a distinctive species of political domination.