Legislative and Educational Alternatives to a Judicial Remedy for the Transfer Trauma Dilemma

Abstract

Transfer trauma is alleged to be an increase in morbidity and mortality in institutionally relocated chronically ill elderly. Efforts by the legal profession to persuade courts that transfer trauma should be a legally recognized phenomenon invoking judicial protections against transfer (the "transfer trauma argument") have been unproductive. In O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc., the United States Supreme Court denied standing to elderly persons claiming a property interest in remaining in alleged substandard facilities. The Court rejected the argument that the possibility of transfer trauma constituted a deprivation of life or liberty that would have required due process protections of notice and hearing. Despite the Court's preclusion of transfer trauma litigation in a constitutional context and the general unwillingness of lower courts to recognize the phenomenon, attorneys continue to burden the judicial system with frivolous transfer trauma arguments. The unfruitful pursuit of a judicial remedy for the ethical and social problems that arise with relocation of the elderly continues, in part, because of a misguided belief that this distressing social phenomenon is best remedied by the courts. Judicial unwillingness to recognize the transfer trauma argument, however, does not preclude legislative consideration of the humanitarian issues concerning the institutional relocation of elderly persons. This Article examines gerontological research in order to understand the judicial rejection of the transfer trauma argument and argues in support of legislative and educational solutions for the ethical and social problems attending transfer.