Legein to What End?

Abstract

ABSTRACT M.M. McCabe’s rich paper makes a number of important contributions to our understanding of the Euthydemus. However, the account of saying [legein] that McCabe attributes to Socrates requires modification. Although McCabe insists that saying—like the learning process, on which her account of saying is based—is a teleological process, she claims that truth is the end of saying because Socrates aims at truth while speaking. I argue that careful attention to Socrates’ discussion of the technai reveals that teleological processes have ends distinct from the psychological goals of those who employ them. If saying is indeed a teleological process and not merely a process used teleologically, it must have a unique end independent of Socrates’ own idiosyncratic goals. By overlooking this fact, McCabe overlooks a source of normativity prominent in the Ethuydemus and important for Plato’s philosophy more generally. Her account of saying can, however, be modified so as to preserve the central insights of her thoughtful paper. I end by making the speculative suggestion that there is a teleological process superordinate to saying which uses saying in the pursuit of truth.