Abstract

One of the many reasons for the deafening silence over Stuxnet cyber attack was the legal vacuum in the regulation of cyber-warfare. It is submitted that there are sound arguments for carving out a limited exception to the rule against pre-emptive self-defence under Public International Law in cases where nation states such as Iran seek to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities in defiance of IAEA Treaty obligations; as such a legitimate legal basis grounded in customary international law, the United Nations Charter and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which Iran is a signatory can be established for the Stuxnet cyber attacks. While much work remains to be done, by extension the issue of the legality of Stuxnet can be put aside in order to liberate academics and policy-makers to focus their energy and intellect on the pressing, complex task of developing a more comprehensive doctrine for regulating the use of a deadly forth type of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the 21st Century, which may not be radically dissimilar to and build upon the foundation of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction that operated successfully throughout the Cold War to make the world a safer place.

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