Abstract

In the modern world, some components of legal relations that do not have legal personality — animals, technical devices, artificial intelligence systems — are able to generate results comparable to works. However, neither regulation of this process, nor legal protection regime of its results are provided in international treaties, and are established less than fragmentary in national law. In this regard, the following questions arise: are the results of the activities of the listed components protected under copyright law and who exactly is the author of such results — the owner of the animal/device/technology, or the direct creator of the result, who is not a human being. A general term “generators of results comparable to the results of intellectual activity” is introduced into the doctrinal turnover, by which it is proposed to understand a component of a legal relation that does not have legal personality in accordance with the law of modern states — animals, technical devices, artificial intelligence, etc., — which, participating in process, partly comparable to human creative activity, are capable of producing (generating) results comparable to objects protected by intellectual property law, in particular, works. Up to date, the idea of generators as objects, not subjects of law, has not been shaken, and copyrights are not granted to them. In view of the possible commercial and artistic value of the results of their “creativity,” it may be advisable to establish a special protection regime without granting anyone non-property (moral) rights, however, with the recognition of all or some of the property rights in the created object for the generator’s proprietor for a reduced period of time.

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