Legal Reasoning Across Commercial Disputes

Abstract

Legal reasoning lies at the heart of the interpretation of the facts, it determines the application of law to the facts or the award of compensation as a result of a finding of liability, and it is of the utmost importance. Laws, court statutes, and arbitration rules require that judgments and awards be reasoned, so that the losing party, as well as every other reader, may be able to follow the reasoning of the adjudicator and understand the decision reached. Yet, legal reasoning is highly individualistic and different judges and arbitrators can decide similar or the same issues in variegated manners. The nagging questions then emerge: how do judges and arbitrators reason and why do they do so? In particular, do arbitrators reason differently than judges and should preference be given to arbitration over a court system, or vice-versa? Do domestic judges and arbitrators decide differently than international judges and arbitrators? Do common law judges and arbitrators reason differently than civil law judges and arbitrators and, to the extent that parties can make appointments, who should they choose? These are important questions that can impact the desirability of one type of dispute settlement over another, the selection and appointment of an arbitrator in a dispute, or the way legal counsel formulate arguments. In order to make sense of the process by which a judge or arbitrator reasons and ultimately decides, and why he or she reasons the way they do, some legal scholars have taken the challenging path of pushing beyond the boundaries of pure legal analysis to engage in interdisciplinary research and study the empirical data that helps explain the process of legal reasoning. Professor SI Strong’s book Legal Reasoning Across Commercial Disputes is unique in this respect, for its innovativeness, robust methodology, the quantitative data it presents, and its qualitative analysis and outcomes.