Abstract

I ask what a proper critical target for ‘legal positivism’ might be. I argue that utilitarian moral theory, and more generally fully directive moral theories, are unacknowledged motivations for legal positivism. Contemporary debate about ‘the nature of law’ is, historically speaking, much more of a footnote to utilitarianism than has been recognized.

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