Legal Intuition. Precis of the Book 'Legal Intuition: Towards External Integration of Legal Theory'

Abstract

The paper summarizes the argument I make in the book concerning the role played in lawyers' reasonings by their intuitive reactions, impression, inclinations, expectations and other similar kinds of mental states. The book examines the nature of intuition using the tools of contemporary cognitive science, evolutionary biology, empirical psychology and philosophy of mind. It points out to the inevitable dependence of reflective, deliberate reasoning and decison-making on nonconscious chains of cognitive-affective associations triggered by automatically detected situational cues. Simultaneously, I critisize the popular view that intuition plays a role in course of decision-making while deliberate reasoning provides post-hoc justification for decisions already taken. I find this view as distorting simplification of reality. In fact, intuition and reflective reasoning take part on both stages - making a decision and providing its justification. In real life there is strong continuity between the context of decision and context of justification. Both relate to the mental representation of the problem and its solution. Such representation emerges in course of dealing with a problem and normally remains as the crucial basis of its justification. The book highlights three main types of influence exerted by intuition on reflective reasoning - expert, routine intuition (easy cases or standard partial problems in course of complex reasoning), motivating the course and outcome of deliberate reasoning as well as insight (a-ha effect) accompanied by subjective experience of sudden complete solution popping up in the mind without mediation by conscious analytic effort.