Abstract
In recent years concerns have been growing in the scientific community over the definition of scientific responsibilities during emergencies, and the legal status of scientists involved in the corresponding decision-making. It is clear that the legal framework is one of the main elements affecting this issue; however, many factors may affect both the specific scientific decision-making and the definition of general scientific responsibilities. The situation will vary depending on the type and scale of emergency, and from place to place, even in the same country. There will be no such thing as a single, ideal solution. In the latest El Hierro volcanic crisis many factors have negatively affected the scientific management and have prevented an adequate definition of scientific responsibility. These factors have been detected and documented by the authors. They include excessive pressure due to human and economic issues, a poor legal framework with identifiable deficiencies, an Emergency Plan in which the Volcanic Activity/Alert Level (VAL), Emergency Response Level (ERL) and Volcanic Traffic Light (VTL) have been too rigidly linked, serious weaknesses in the management and structure of the Scientific Committee (SC), and more. Even though some of these problems have now been detected and certain solutions have already been proposed, the slowness and complexity of the bureaucratic processes are making it difficult to implement solutions.
Highlights
The assessment of what constitutes success or failure in crisis management is still very complex and subject to heated debate (McConnell 2011)
Severe pressure on the scientific decision-making The decision-making process in high-risk areas is conditioned by many factors; several of the most relevant are: the type and form in which the information is provided by scientists, and how well it is understood by non-scientists (Fearnley 2013; McGuire et al 2009; Solana et al 2008); human and economic factors applicable in the area (Aguirre and Ahearn 2007; Lane et al 2003); risk perception (Haynes et al 2008b); reputational and similar intangible costs for individuals and groups (Metzger et al 1999); the treatment by the mass media of the natural phenomena in question (Birkland 1996; Francken et al 2012); and previous experiences of similar hazards (Cardona 1997)
Discrepancies have existed between the scientific decisions taken by the Scientific Committee (SC) and the final information communicated to the Advisory Committee, despite the fact that some decision-makers and public officials were present at meetings of both
Summary
The assessment of what constitutes success or failure in crisis management is still very complex and subject to heated debate (McConnell 2011). Operational flexibility in the emergency response might be reduced by the official Plan, due to the complexity of the legal framework (Dan et al 2012; Dynes 1994), potential failures or weaknesses detected during an actual or simulated response to a major incident (Haynes 2006), deficiencies in the definitions of expected hazard scenarios (Rolandi 2010), and other issues It is a difficult, if not impossible, task to modify an Emergency Plan while an emergency is being handled; firstly because of the ongoing responsibilities and liabilities of crisis management, and secondly because, depending on the particular legislative framework, a new bureaucratic process must be initiated.
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