Abstract
This article intends to develop a thesis of “legal federalism, with the Chinese style” and test it with an empirical study on China’s labor law. It makes the following argument: (1) subnational governments in China have a quite high level of autonomy in exercising legal powers (including legislative and judicial powers) and such legal autonomy is institutionally guaranteed to the extent that these governments (in particular provincial-level governments) appear to be a quasi-legal sovereignty, which makes China a system of legal federalism; (2) legal federalism in China is not only de facto but also de jure in a sense. Not only can such a system of legal federalism be empirically proved, but also it has significant impacts on daily protection of legal rights in different localities.
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