Legal criteria for distinguishing between the subject and the object in the procedure for editing the human genome

Abstract

In this article, the author attempts to differentiate between the object and the subject in human genome editing procedures. The criteria for such distinction are individualization, passive capacity, active capacity and free will. The status of the embryo was analysed, since then the child is considered to have been born when the subject acquires the right to life. The reference is made to international instruments and to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Special attention is paid to the legality of biomedical research involving embryos in vivo and in vitro, as well as to the purposes of such intervention. As a key criterion for distinguishing between the object and the subject, the author emphasizes the existence of his free will. This criterion is reflected in one of the key principles applied to medical intervention and the existence of voluntary written consent to be manipulated. By distinguishing between object and subject, by means of identified criteria, it will be possible to ensure adequate protection of human rights and freedoms during the editing of the genome at the international and national levels.