Legal constraints, environmental variability, and the limits of innovative environmental governance

Abstract

Abstract Using CALFED as a case study, this article explores problems with a conventional conceptual framework for understanding environmental crises. That framework, which both derives from and influences legal regimes, posits that environmental managers should fulfill the protective requirements of environmental laws, but should discern exactly where the brink of non-compliance lies and should allow or even facilitate resource consumption right up to that perceived edge. In contexts like CALFED, where environmental conditions are uncertain and institutions are unavoidably somewhat rigid and inflexible, that approach will function poorly, and this article therefore articulates an alternative conceptual approach capable of improving the reliability of resource allocation patterns. That alternative approach posits that in conditions of scarcity, environmental uncertainty, and rigidly constraining environmental laws, the intensity and reliability of resource use are likely to be inversely proportional, and reducing the intensity of consumptive use will tend to increase the stability and reliability of consumptive patterns.