Abstract
Abstract Technological innovations can significantly impact market structures and the behavior of actors, necessitating legal changes. However, in the face of technological changes brought by sharing economy, there is a differential in the responsiveness of rule-making institutions across different jurisdictions. This article analyses the rule-making institutions that allow for the regulatory changes procured by Uber and the institutional impediments that may restrict jurisdiction in accommodating this type of crowd-based technological disrupters. Uber’s non-adoption in Hong Kong is compared to its success in the United States to evaluate the limitations of rule-making institutions in responding to the legal change required by sharing economy companies. Changes in the rule-making institutions themselves may be needed to accelerate technological innovations and economic growth. This article suggests that there is a lack of institutional adaptability in Hong Kong, where the rule-making institutions are unable to facilitate potential regulatory reform. While the feasibility of changing a particular jurisdiction’s electoral system and political systems may be low, jurisdictions can improve the accountability of their executive regulators by modifying the incentive structure.
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