Abstract
In this essay, I mobilize an argument that has been advanced by writers such as Ashley Tellis and George Perkovich. Because this argumentation is fundamental to this essay, I will detail its components at length here. First, due to inadequacies in the 1974 test, the scientists and others within the strategic enclave increasingly sought approval from the government to resume testing. Until 1998, these entreaties were ultimately declined by the civilian leadership – despite several bouts of high degrees of readiness for resumed testing that were often (but not always) observed by the United States. In 1998, the BJP returned to power and fulfilled its often stated intent to resume nuclear tests. Therefore, the 1998 blasts at Pokhran should have been at best a tactical – not strategic – surprise.
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