Abstract
Deceit is a significant aspect of the misuse of power. This article demonstrates how to identify and redress a “preemptive” form of this misconduct through a case study of the Iraq Dossier. The media claimed that the Dossier was inconsistent with the original intelligence reports, which was not possible to verify. This analysis shows that the Dossier is inconsistent with itself, which was missed because the initial media reaction distracted attention from careful scrutiny. The Dossier’s main text does not make a substantive claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. That claim was only made in altered phraseology within the title, foreword, summary, and conclusions. Relevant omissions within the formal inquiries are identified, and areas of redress are examined, specifically “misconduct in public office.” The case study is then discussed in terms of defining, conceptualizing, and teaching about “preemptive deceit.”
Highlights
IntroductionOn September 24, 2002, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair presented the “Iraq Dossier,” Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, to the Parliament and to the public (The Stationary Office, 2002)
On September 24, 2002, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair presented the “Iraq Dossier,” Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, to the Parliament and to the public (The Stationary Office, 2002). This influenced Parliament to support British involvement in the United States–led invasion and occupation of Iraq. It was seen by the British media and public as evidence of a significant threat from Saddam Hussein, but quickly it became viewed as misleading because of apparent “inserts” (Miller, 2003)
In 2003, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee pointed to errors made by the government, but these were not reported as significant
Summary
On September 24, 2002, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair presented the “Iraq Dossier,” Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, to the Parliament and to the public (The Stationary Office, 2002). This influenced Parliament to support British involvement in the United States–led invasion and occupation of Iraq. At first, it was seen by the British media and public as evidence of a significant threat from Saddam Hussein, but quickly it became viewed as misleading because of apparent “inserts” (Miller, 2003).
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