Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper considers the negotiation strategies of the Taliban in Afghanistan and JNIM in Mali. It examines negotiation paths, whether jihadists learn from each other, and why some negotiations succeed over others. The Taliban’s strategy inspired JNIM, but while the Taliban secured the USA’s withdrawal in Afghanistan, JNIM has suffered from contextual churn in Mali. France vacated Mali, coups installed a military junta, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara is growing, and Russia’s Wagner Group is ascending. It has been difficult to identify parties to negotiate with and unlikely that any type of accommodation will be reached soon.
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