Learning from Divided Parties? Legislator Dissent as a Cue for Opinion Formation

Abstract

Scholars have generally seen united parties as normatively desirable. However, little work has explored the implications of divided parties for public opinion. This article examines whether legislator dissent reduces public support for the policy positions of divided parties. Dissent can do this in two ways: by undermining the consistency of party cues sent to co-partisans of the divided party; or by providing a signal regarding the likely distance of the policy proposal from citizen preferences. These possibilities are evaluated here using a survey experiment. Respondents were exposed to mock news articles about a debate on a bill that manipulated the presence of dissent on government benches and its spatial location—either proximate to the opposition party or located on the government party’s ideological flank. Legislator dissent appears to reduce the support of government policy for opposition co-partisans, but only when it is centrist and for those with high levels of political knowledge. These results suggest legislator dissent can act as a cue, if a complex one, to help citizens form policy evaluations in line with their preferences.