Learning and forgetting counterinsurgency

Abstract

This chapter focuses on learning from counterinsurgency operations, the question of how knowledge is retained after conflict is of course germane for any type of conflict. Although a significant portion of these works describe the recent counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, other historical conflicts have also been studied extensively. The primary example of recent organisational learning in conflict is the publication in 2006 of the American Field Manual on counterinsurgency and the subsequent change in strategy for Iraq. Armed forces that only reluctantly adapted to challenges of counterinsurgency campaigns can then revert back to their traditional outlook, thereby discarding the knowledge from past conflicts. Cases like these show that some lessons from the recent counterinsurgency campaigns have indeed been acknowledged for use in future conflict. The chapter concludes with an assessment of why transferring knowledge from recent counterinsurgency experiences continues to be difficult in Western armed forces and why this subject provides ample opportunity for additional research.