Abstract

AbstractSecurity mechanisms in the traditional cryptography have been modeled under the assumption that secret values (keys) are completely hidden to an adversary. Indeed, a number of side‐channel attacks (e.g., timing, power, fault, etc.) have been demonstrated to obtain partial information about secret keys. Leakage‐resilient cryptography is a countermeasure to withstand side‐channel attacks. Recently, a large number of leakage‐resilient cryptographic schemes or protocols have been proposed to resist various side‐channel attacks. Up to now, no work has been done on leakage‐resilient identity‐based signature (LR‐IBS). In this article, we propose the first LR‐IBS scheme based on Galindo and Vivek's leakage‐resilient signature. In the generic bilinear group model, we formally prove that our LR‐IBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against identity and adaptive chosen message attacks under the continual leakage model. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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