Abstract
Certificateless public-key system (CL-PKS) is a significant public-key cryptography and it solves both the key escrow and certificate management problems. Outsourced revocable certificateless public-key system (ORCL-PKS) with a cloud revocation server (CRS) not only provides a revocation mechanism, but also further outsources the revocation functionality to the CRS to reduce the computational burden of the key generation center (KGC). Recently, side-channel attacks have threatened some existing conventional cryptography (including CL-PKS). Indeed, adversaries can apply side-channel attacks to derive fractional constituents of private (or secret) keys to damage the security of these cryptographic protocols (or schemes). To withstand such attacks, leakage-resilient cryptography is an attractive approach. However, little research concerns with leakage-resilient certificateless cryptography. In this paper, the first leakage-resilient outsourced revocable certificateless signature (LR-ORCLS) scheme is presented. The proposed scheme allows adversaries to continually derive fractional constituents of private (or secret) keys and possesses overall unbounded leakage property. In the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, our scheme is shown to be existential unforgeable against adversaries. Finally, the comparisons between the proposed scheme and the previous revocable certificateless signature schemes are provided to demonstrate the merits of the proposed scheme.
Highlights
Certificateless public-key system (CL-PKS) [1] is a significant public-key cryptography
In the outsourced RCLS (ORCLS) scheme, the revocation functionality is outsourced to the cloud revocation server (CRS) to reduce the computational burden of the key generation center (KGC)
A LR-ORCLS scheme is better than a LR-revocable certificateless signature (RCLS) scheme because the revocation functionality is outsourced to the CRS to reduce the computational burden of the KGC
Summary
Certificateless public-key system (CL-PKS) [1] is a significant public-key cryptography. The KGC first applies the identity information of a user to derive her/ his identity key, while the user selects a secret key and sets the associated public key. The certificate revocation list (CRL) [11] is a well-known revocation method in traditional public-key systems This method cannot be applied to both ID-PKS and CL-PKS settings because they do not employ the usage of certificates. Adversaries can apply side-channel attacks to derive fractional constituent of a user’s secret (or private) key to damage the security of conventional cryptography. To withstand such attacks, leakage-resilient cryptography is an attractive approach. Our aim is to design the first leakage-resilient ORCLS (LR-ORCLS) scheme
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