Leakage-Resilient Hybrid Signcryption in Heterogeneous Public-key Systems

Abstract

Signcryption integrates both signature and encryption schemes into single scheme to ensure both content unforgeability (authentication) and message confidentiality while reducing computational complexity. Typically, both signers (senders) and decrypters (receivers) in a signcryption scheme belong to the same public-key systems. When signers and decrypters in a signcryption scheme belong to heterogeneous public-key systems, this scheme is called a hybrid signcryption scheme which provides more elastic usage than typical signcryption schemes. In recent years, a new kind of attack, named side-channel attack, allows adversaries to learn a portion of the secret keys used in cryptographic algorithms. To resist such an attack, leakage-resilient cryptography has been widely discussed and studied while a large number of leakage-resilient schemes have been proposed. Also, numerous hybrid signcryption schemes under heterogeneous public-key systems were proposed, but none of them possesses leakage-resilient property. In this paper, we propose the first hybrid signcryption scheme with leakage resilience, called leakage-resilient hybrid signcryption scheme, in heterogeneous public-key systems (LR-HSC-HPKS). Security proofs are demonstrated to show that the proposed scheme provides both authentication and confidentiality against two types of adversaries in heterogeneous public-key systems.