Leadership Tactics for Retrenchment

Abstract

In addressing these questions, the panelists were asked to examine the links between responsibilities, motivations and incentives. Obviously, political leaders will not fulfill their responsibilities (whatever these might be) unless they have the incentives to do so. And, it would seem, political leaders have a number of reasons for ignoring the realities of retrenchment-indeed, for denying that real cutbacks are required. In such an environment, even those willing (for whatever reasons) to initiate retrenchment will be confronted by those who argue that there exists no disease and thus no cure is necessary. Consequently, any discussion of managment during retrenchment must confront the reality of the most fundamental political motivations and examine the possibilities for creating incentives to encourage and facilitate responsible leadership. The following papers were originally presented in San Francisco last April, and have since been revised by the authors. In the first, Robert P. Biller suggests a number of specific leadership tactics for retrenchment. Biller's theme is that retrenchment will happen much more smoothly and productively if the process can be designed so that individuals and organizations are not punished by their participation in it but can actually see the potential for reaping some rewards for doing so. In the second paper, Robert D. Wilburn and Michael A. Worman present some lessons from their experiences managing retrenchment in Pennsylvania. In particular, they focus on the limits to personnel cutbacks and suggest possibilities for overcoming these barriers. Next, 1 examine how an explicit corporate strategy can be used to help lead an agency (or even a city or state) through a period of retrenchment so as to emerge with a healthy and productive organization. The concept of corporate strategy has been well developed for use by business, but there is little recognition in government of the value for leadership and management of a coherent set of organizational purposes, goals, essential policies, programs, and plans. Finally, Irene Rubin discusses the incentives that politicians have for running concealed budget deficits and for allowing them to grow. She suggests two linked strategies: develop formal procedures to make various indicators of the deficit very clear in the budget; and replace the politician's traditional source of political capital (projects funded from budgetary growth) with less expensive (often symbolic) resources. Robert D. Behn