Leadership preferences and ethnic bargaining: theory and illustrations

Abstract

PurposeIn explaining ethno-territorial conflicts, leadership preferences have an odd status. In case studies, leadership preferences are often viewed as highly significant causes but are not usually defined and measured explicitly. In large-sample statistical studies, leadership preferences are only captured by weakly related proxy variables. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing suitable theory, which can be used consistently in both case study and statistical applications.Design/methodology/approachFormal bargaining models are used to examine the expected impact of variation in leadership preferences. Relevant leadership characteristics are then used to construct measures of variation in leadership preferences, which are applied in case studies.FindingsIn bargaining models, variation in leadership preferences is expected to have a significant impact on ethno-territorial conflict outcomes. More extreme nationalist leaders and, more conditionally, strongly power-seeking leaders, should be more likely to be willing to use force to modify the status quo – although more moderate nationalist leaderships are also willing to do so under certain conditions. In five case studies, these formally derived hypotheses receive initial empirical support.Originality/valueTheoretically and empirically, further refinement of research on variation in leadership preferences promises to add significant value. Formally, it is worth investigating the expected impact of additional preference types. Empirically, it is important to invest in measures of leadership preferences across large samples.