Leadership PAC Formation and Distribution Strategies in the United States Senate

Abstract

ABSTRACT Fundraising through leadership PACs, or political action committees associated with members of Congress, became increasingly prevalent during the 1990s. Such fundraising has become a critical component of how senators market themselves to colleagues, party leaders, constituents, and journalists. This paper first analyzes what motivates senators to form PACs to test the theory that senators are rational, self-interested actors who use PACs to achieve four major goals: reelection, good public policy, influence within the Senate, and higher office. These goals do not conflict with regard to PAC creation, and results show that creation is influenced by seniority, ideology, electoral margin, leadership candidacy, and presidential candidacy. The article then asks why some senators distribute most PAC funds for their own travel and administrative expenses while others donate primarily to colleagues. Although member goals may conflict, analysis of disbursement patterns indicates a relationship between goals and PAC behavior. Presidential candidates spend relatively more on administrative expenses, while majority party members donate a higher proportion of funds to colleagues.