Abstract
The objective of this paper is to study optimal pricing strategies in a duopoly, under an asymmetric information structure, where the appropriate solution concept is the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. In order to take into account effects such as imitation (e.g., word of mouth) and saturation, the demand (state equation) is assumed to depend on past cumulative sales, market potential, and both players' prices. We assume also that the unit production cost decreases with cumulative production (learning effects). Each player maximizes his total discounted profit over the planning horizon.
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