Abstract
AbstractUncertainty about the succession often translates into coups and depositions. The authors document these patterns in the context of their sample of medieval and early modern polities and also show how monarchs in states that practiced primogeniture sat more securely on their thrones than monarchs in states practicing other succession orders such as elective monarchy or agnatic seniority. This, it is argued, is because of the ‘shadow of the future’ cast by anticipated crises of succession, as well as the incentives of potential successors. When rulers started to enjoy longer tenures, their time horizons also increased, encouraging investment in and development of states.
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