Lawyers as Bureaucrats: The Impact of Legal Training in the Higher Civil Service

Abstract

7 he decline of public confidence experienced by various professional groups in the United States is vividly represented by the sharp criticism which has recently been directed against the legal profession.' One aspect of this criticism is concern over the possible undue influence of lawyers on public policy. This concern has been explored in a variety of contexts. Studies of the impact of lawyers on policy formation and policy content have included analyses of the relationship between legal training and participation in public office, particularly elected office, the influence of legal background on legislative decision making and the values, behavior, and experiences of lawyers in non-legislative institutional settings.2 Other studies have focused on the impact of the law school experience in socializing law students and analyzing the possible consequences of such socialization for government policy making.3 These latter studies have suffered from a number of weaknesses, among which have been a non-quantitative and anecdotal approach, or a tendency to overgeneralize from law students at a single institution. Additionally, these studies have generally failed to consider possible distinctions between lawyers in government who are primarily engaged in litigatory activity and those who are functioning in capacities other than strictly as lawyers. Finally, studies of lawyers in non-elective positions have not attempted to compare lawyers in influential policy positions with executives of other backgrounds in similar positions. Due to these omissions and weaknesses, questions concerning the alleged effect of lawyers on government policy making are far from resolved. This paper investigates the supposed policy influence of executives with legal backgrounds in the higher federal civil service. The first section of the paper discusses some of the arguments which support the assertion that lawyers in government have undue policy influence. The following sections bring empirical data to bear on these arguments.