Abstract

In this chapter, Peter Harrison first shows that the Cambridge Platonists accepted Descartes's emphasis on the fundamental laws of nature, but rejected many of the details of his account on several grounds: They did not approve of Descartes’ speculative method, favoring more experimental procedures; they were concerned about the potentially heretical theological consequences of Descartes's position; finally, on scientific grounds they rejected Descartes's aetherial matter and vortices, positing a “spirit of nature” or “plastic nature” instead that serves as an intermediary between God and the creation. Harrison then notes that the Cambridge Platonists’ position was viewed by their successors as problematic, since it seemed to be asserted more as a hypothesis than as something based on empirical evidence. As a result, Harrison argues, several Newtonianscame to the position that the laws of nature are basic explanatory principles that cannot be deduced from the nature of God, but rather must be discovered and justified through experience.

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