Abstract
ABSTRACTInAccuracy and the Laws of Credence, Richard Pettigrew gives several decision-theoretic arguments for formal requirements on rational credence. Pettigrew's arguments build on a central notion of epistemic value, but employ different decision rules. These comments explore how our choice of decision rule might matter, and discuss one of Pettigrew's arguments in detail: his argument for the Principle of Indifference, which relies on Maximin.
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