Law, Obligation, and a Good Faith Claim of Justice

Abstract

In A Theory of Law, Philip Soper makes a number of bold claims concerning legal and political theory. Among these are claims that (1) legal theory-theory about What is law?-has reached a dead end at which it no longer responds to questions of concern to anyone other than professional philosophers (pp. 1-7); (2) political theory-theory about Why should one obey the law?-blithely assumes a positivist concept of law that itself guarantees the conclusion that there is no general prima facie obligation to obey (pp. 7-12); (3) legal and political theory should be connected by posing as the central question of both, What is law that it should be obeyed? (pp. 7-12, 91-100); and (4) joining these theoretical endeavors permits the development of an adequate and relevant nonpositivist theory of law that also solves the problem of political obligation (pp. vii, 91-100). Soper sets an agenda that is too ambitious for complete philosophical treatment in a book of modest length, but his claims are stimulating and sufficiently developed to be worthy of serious consideration.