Law and the Moral Paradox in Plato's Apology

Abstract

Law and the Moral Paradox in Plato's Apology* RONALD F. HATHAWAY 1. ASSUMPTIONS LET US SUPPOSE, in agreement with the oldest tradition, that the dialogues of Plato are Socratic? Let us suppose that every philosophic question presented in the dialogues as fundamental can be made intelligibleonly in terms of the Socratic standpoint. Let us further suggest that the heart of the Socratic standpoint is the view that although nature and law (nomos) axe not in harmony with one another them exists a philosophic preservation of right through reason which if scrupulously followed will bring about a kind of harmony .between nature and law or a natural justice.2 Then it is argued that Plato's Apology is the firstplace in which one can see the principal problem posed by the Socratic standpoint, the puzzling nexus of law and the Socratic moral paradox. The first part of Socrates' questioning (erotesis)of Meletus is based on a paradox which in this carefully chosen context places the maximum possible claim upon law for its sonse of mercy and justice,a claim which ifallowed to stand would seemingly undermine the entire meaning and role of punishment in law? Contrary to the bias of modern commentary, there is nothing "'accidental" or merely occasional about the moves of Socrates here; his questioning of Meletus is intended to be an archetype and a paradigm. In order to show this point clearly, it will be necessary firstto correct three mi.~leading assumptions about the Apology currently in vogue and next to propose a working definition of a paradox. To begin with, the titleof the Apology is wrong; it is not an "apology." Socrates does not excuse himself. The right rendering of its titleis,as many scholars have * I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Thomas Schrock for reading earlier versions of this paper. Plat. Epist., II, 314c3-4; Aristot[e, De arte poet., I, 7-9, 1447b lI; Aristotle, De part. anon., I, 1, 642a28-31; Cicero, De oratore. [[I, 15, 60, 67, 72; Academica, I, 16-17; II (Lucullus), 74; De fin., V, 84; D. L. Socrates. II, 47; D.G. 567, 1-4. Cf. Rep., VI, 501b 1-7 with Laws, IX, 874e7-875d 5; Laws, X, 889e-890a with the sequel; Crat., 390c2-11. Cf. Xenophon, Mere., I, vi 15; Dio Chrysostom, IH De regnoo 29-41. s George Anastaplo, "Human Being and Citizen, A Beginning to the Study of Plato's Apology of Socrates," Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, ed. J. Cropsey (New York, 1964), p. 18: "Socrates' argument . . . denies the possibilities . . . perhaps even of any legRimate criminal law." Cf. Arthur W. H. Adklns, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1960), pp. 304-308, for a brief sketch of Plato's treatment of punishment. [127] 128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY noted, 4 Defense of Socrates, and I shall hereafter refer to it as the Defense. Defenses and excuses are different things. Second, the Defense, invariably called one of the dialogues of Plato, is obviously not a dialogue but a work of forensic or protrcptic rhetoric, s The ancient view that the Defense is a "declaration" of what it means to be a philosopher e captures the surface ambiguity of the work, which is deeper than rhetoric, regarded as persuading to believe with words, and shallower than philosophy, regarded as pursuing truth with valid arguments. The dialogues of Plato differ from the Defense in one cardinal point. The dialogues are investigations of things, not of men. The unknown, the quae~tio of the Defense can be answered with a yes or no, guilty or not guilty, but the unknowns or quaestiones of the dialogues cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. It may be objected that further consideration would show that the Defense raises philosophic questions. Yet as a point of departure it would be a mistake to treat a speech in defense as something other than it is, a philosophic investigation. The third false assumption is that the style of the Defense or other adduced historical evidence is sufficient proof that Plato, at the time of writing, was naive as a philosopher...