Abstract

In popular parlance, lawfulness and randomness are polar opposites. Indeed, in some jurisprudential theories (see, e.g., Pospisil, 1971), predictability is the sine qua non of law. Without reliability of application, law cannot be expected, as a practical matter, to guide the behavior of the citizenry (cf. Melton & Saks, 1985) or, as an ethical matter, to ensure justice in the conduct of affairs of state (cf. Rawls, 1971). Assertion of such a principle is likely to engender little controversy. Predictability is, after all, the foundation of the doctrine of stare decisis that serves as the major principle of legal decision making in common-law jurisdictions, and it is embedded in the fundamental legal constructs of due process and equal protection. With predictability’s status as an elemental feature of law, one might expect particular care to ensure reliable application of state authority in those areas of law that govern the relationships and institutions that are most basic in society. Indeed, without such care the integrity of the legal system itself is questionable.

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