Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor (eds): Religious faith and intellectual virtue

Abstract

Let me begin with what I take to be the two most significant features of this collection. First, it addresses an area that is woefully under-discussed: the intersection of virtue epistemology and philosophy of religion. Each is a massively influential and important field in its own right, so bringing the two into dialogue makes tremendous sense. This collection accomplishes much in this regard but also underscores the amount of work that needs to be developed. Bringing together virtue epistemology, philosophy of religion, testimony, analyses of trust/faith, disagreement, etc. makes the volume of interest to philosophers working in a wide variety of fields. Second, each contributor is an extremely capable philosopher on the cutting edge of his/her field. The list is a murderer’s row of epistemologists and philosophers of religion, and their contributions will accordingly provide fodder for continued work regarding all of the topics discussed. W. Jay Wood begins with the necessity of faith (a term he tends to use equivalently to trust). Epistemically speaking, we must trust ourselves and others if we’re to obtain anything approaching a rich store of epistemic values (knowledge, understanding, etc.). Such faith/trust is a necessary ground for intellectual virtue. Then he extends this account to religious faith: like trust in ourselves and others, we must extend it in order to obtain any religious epistemic goods (religious knowledge, acquaintance with God, etc.). Motivated by a Thomistic approach to virtue and faith, Wood traces a line from virtuous non-religious faith to virtuous religious faith. Lara Buchak brings decision theory to bear on religious faith. For her, having faith that X means giving up the search for further evidence relevant to one’s decisionmaking procedures about how to act. Thus, “it is rational to have faith that X by considering when it is rational to perform risky acts on X without more evidence” (p.