Abstract
The strategy of launch under attack calls for launching nuclear weapons on warning that attacking weapons are on their way. The political pressures for adopting this strategy are symptomatic of an increasing instability in the nuclear balance. The author describes a Brookings Institute model, which indicates that the problems of decentralized control and precise timing could lead to failures in retargeting procedures. The major concern is that the strategy imposes powerful incentives for preemption as the most promising means of conducting nuclear war.
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