Abstract
Abstract This article takes a comprehensive look at developments in Latvia’s security and defence policies since 2014. The annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the military conflict in Ukraine provided a major impetus for Latvian decision-makers to counter external and domestic threats to national security. The article discusses three key aspects of Latvia’s post-2014 security and defence developments. First, it looks at the transformation of security perceptions on the policy-making level. Second, the article discusses Latvia’s efforts to strengthen its military capabilities. Domestic security developments are also discussed. Third, differences between attitudes of Latvians and Russian-speakers towards a number of security and defence-related issues are presented. The article concludes that much has been done since 2014, but progress has been uneven. It will take more than just a few years to close the existing gaps in domestic and external security of Latvia.
Highlights
It has become a cliché to argue that the Baltic states’ security and defence policies have been heavily affected by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine
Latvia, and Estonia were increasingly seen as NATO frontline allies subject to potential military and other probes by Russia (Grygiel & Mitchel 2016)
Despite tje newly approved State Defence Concept (2016) which states that resilience is one of Latvia’s defence pillars, have not yet acknowledged that policies aimed at civil security are needed to increase the resilience of society
Summary
It has become a cliché to argue that the Baltic states’ security and defence policies have been heavily affected by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Besides the lack of selfdefence capabilities, other areas of vulnerabilities towards Russia’s so-called hybrid warfare were identified: lack of NATO military presence in the Baltic region, inability to protect Latvia’s information space, underfunded interior security structures (Security Police, Boarder Guard etc.), weak cooperation and coordination between defence and interior sectors, and potentially harmful effects of the presence of a large Russian-speaking minority in Latvia. Priority was given to such critical self-defence capabilities as electronic warfare at tactical level, medium and long indirect fire support, ground based short and medium range air defence, command and control with other NATO units, anti-tank, SOF, information operations in a very broad sense and others Development of these capabilities has gone hand in hand with procurements. Considering the fact that air defence systems are extremely expensive, Latvia signed an agreement with Lithuania in 2016 on synchronising their efforts in defence procurement, especially with regard to medium range air defence systems (LSM 14 September 2016)
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