Latin American health policy and additive reform: the case of Guatemala.

Abstract

Until the mid-1960s, the market-based, dependent-development-conditioned structure of Latin American health systems reflected the skewed distribution of wealth in the region: most (including government) health resources were found in curative care medicine and were concentrated in the capital cities, where they primarily served the needs of the elite. But for many countries of the area, the 1964 PAHO-led efforts to introduce health planning, intended as a first step in rationalizing the health sector, marked a fundamental turning point in the structural development of their delivery systems. Since then, this commitment has been reaffirmed in the Latin American Ministers of Health's 1973 adoption of the primary care approach as the cornerstone of their national health plans, and their ongoing endorsement and pursuit of "Health For All by 2000." Guatemala, however, was and remains an exception. Guatemalan technocrats have proven unable to plan effectively. But, far more fundamentally, the Guatemalan oligarchy has proven unwilling to appropriate the resources necessary to effect change. The reforms that have been made have been the products of bilateral and multilateral agencies, which have conceptualized, promoted, designed, built, and underwritten them. Those changes have not altered the fundamental structure of the system, but instead have been tacked onto it, and exemplify what may be termed "additive reform." Evidence suggests that without the continued sponsorship, support, and guidance of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, even these "reforms" will prove evanescent.