Abstract
We provide evidence of the effect of term limits on the rent-seeking behavior of directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam by showing that these directors recruit substantially more employees just before retirement. We argue that a possible motive of these directors for the over-recruitment is to obtain bribes from employees, since the increase in employment is not associated with higher output, and the effect of these directors’ last year in office on SOE labor is smaller in provinces with better corruption control. This finding also provides an explanation why SOEs tend to have an excess of labor and suggests that privatization can reduce this excess.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
