Language effects on bargaining.

Michael J Weir,Natallia Leuchanka Diessner,Catherine M Ashcraft,Todd Guilfoos,Bridie Mcgreavy,Emily Vogler

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0229501

Abstract

Language is critical to coordination in groups. Though, how language affects coordination in groups is not well understood. We prime distributive and integrative language in a bargaining experiment to better understand the links between group outcomes and communication. We accomplish this by priming interests or positions language in randomized groups. We find that priming positions as opposed to interests language leads to agreements where controllers, subjects with unilateral authority over the group outcome, receive a larger share of the benefits but where the total benefits to the group are unaffected. In contrast to common justifications for the use of integrative language in bargaining, our experimental approach revealed no significant differences between priming interests and positions language in regards to increasing joint outcomes for the groups. Across treatments, we find subjects that use gain frames and make reference to visuals aids during bargaining experience larger gains for the group, while loss frames and pro-self language experience larger gains for the individual through side payments. This finding suggests a bargainer’s dilemma: whether to employ language that claims a larger share of group’s assets or employ language to increase joint gains.

Highlights

Language is a defining feature of human interaction
We further investigate the differences in means using additional controls and the ordinary least squares (OLS) model
We show in Table A in S1 File that the treatment effect is robust to inclusion of controls in a multivariate econometric design estimating Eq 2

Summary

Introduction

Language is a defining feature of human interaction. As researchers in the discipline of communication have argued, language as the coordinated use of symbols is, arguably, what makes us human [1]. Communication, through language, plays a vital role in the development of complex rules, social norms, and understandings between and within groups [2,3,4,5]. Bargaining, in particular, relies on communication to coordinate group outcomes and organize collective action to solve complex problems, such as climate change or common resource management [6,7,8]. Bargaining impasses are often a result of information asymmetries [9, 10] and language is used to navigate those issues of fairness and unknown private values. How language is used to coordinate group outcomes is critical to group and individual performance, evolutionary selection of strategies, and the structure of institutions

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Results

Conclusion