Abstract

Many studies imply causal links between linguistic competencies and Theory of Mind (ToM). But despite Dyslexia being a prime example of linguistic deficits, studies on whether it is related to ToM have been relatively unforthcoming. In the first of 2 studies (N = 89), independently-diagnosed dyslexic adults and non-dyslexic adults were presented with false-belief vignettes via computer, answering 4 types of question (Factual, Inference, 1st-order ToM & 2nd-order ToM). Dyslexia related to lower false-belief scores. Study 2 (N = 93) replicated this result with a non-computer-based variant on the false-belief task. We considered the possibility that the apparent-issue with ToM is caused by processing demands more associated to domains of cognition such as language, than to ToM itself. Addressing this possibility, study 2 additionally utilised the ToM30Q questionnaire, designed largely to circumvent issues related to language and memory. Principal-Components analysis extracted 4 factors, 2 capturing perceptual/representational ToM, and the other 2 capturing affective components related to ToM. The ToM30Q was validated via its associations to a published measure of empathy, replication of the female gender advantage over males, and for one factor from the ToM30Q there was a correlation with an existing published index of ToM. However, when we considered the performance of dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants using the ToM30Q, we found absolutely no difference between them. The contrasting findings from our 2 studies here, arguably offer the first experimental evidence with adults, that there is in fact no ToM deficit in dyslexia. Additionally, this finding raises the possibility that some other groups considered in some sense atypical, failed ToM tasks, not because they actually have a ToM deficit at all, but rather because they are asked to reveal their ToM competence through cognitive domains, such as language and memory.

Highlights

  • Theory of Mind (ToM) is the socio-cognitive ability to theorise about the mind as typically the cause and sometimes the target of behaviour, and the related cognitive ability to take another person’s subjective perspective irrespective of whether the reasoner holds that perspective him/herself (Moran, 2013; Abdel-Hamid et al, 2019; cf. Premack and Dasser, 1991; Tompkins et al, 2013)

  • Study 1 already showed that the self-reporting and university student support service identification of dyslexia as a diagnosis is in line with reading, spelling and WM scores

  • If we are correct in our assumption that ToM tasks based around falsebelief can be distorted because of their reliance on cognitive structures such as memory and language (Bloom and German, 2000), we should find the Rutherford task intimates a ToM deficit related to dyslexia that is similar to what we found in study

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Summary

Introduction

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the socio-cognitive ability to theorise about the mind as typically the cause and sometimes the target of behaviour, and the related cognitive ability to take another person’s subjective perspective irrespective of whether the reasoner holds that perspective him/herself (Moran, 2013; Abdel-Hamid et al, 2019; cf. Premack and Dasser, 1991; Tompkins et al, 2013). Many experimental tasks for assessing ToM derive from the form of a “false-belief task” devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983) In this simple yet ingenious task, the reasoner must give a response indicating s/he understands that a person’s behaviour is based on that person’s subjective perception, as distinct from the reasoner’s own current factual knowledge of the situation (Premack and Dasser, 1991; Lillard, 2015). There are parallel profiles of ToM development across Eastern and Western cultures, the age at which a particular culture passes on false-belief tasks can vary by as much as 2 years (Naito, 2003) This finding was robustly confirmed in a meta-analytic comparison between 196 studies carried out in China and 155 studies carried out in the US (Liu et al, 2008). This may impact on our ability to make precise comparisons across diverse groups when relying only on false-belief tasks

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