Abstract
This paper investigates Wittgenstein’s account of the relation between elementary and molecular propositions (and thus, also, the propositions of logic) in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus . I start by sketching a natural reading of that relation - which I call the “bipartite reading” - holding that the Tractatus gives an account of elementary propositions, based on the so-called picture theory, and a different account of molecular ones, based on the principle of truth-functionality. I then show that such a reading cannot be attributed to Wittgenstein, because he holds the view that an explanation of logical complexity is already given by a correct account of the (pictorial) nature of elementary propositions; this is implied in his claim that “an elementary proposition contains all logical constants/operations in itself”. After clarifying Wittgenstein’s notion of an operation from the Notes on Logic to the Tractatus , I finally explain why Wittgenstein claims that an elementary proposition contains all logical operations in itself, and hence why he can be said to provide a unified (and thus not bipartite) account of language and logic.
Highlights
This paper investigates Wittgenstein’s account of the relation between elementary and molecular propositions in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
If we take the claim that an elementary proposition contains all logical operations literally, this would be in striking contrast to what Wittgenstein says at 5.233: “Operations cannot make their appearance before the point at which one proposition is generated out of another in a logically meaningful way; i.e., the point at which the logical construction of propositions begins.” In the Tractatus, likewise, Wittgenstein says that “[t]he possibility of negation is already written into affirmation” (TLP 5.44, my emphasis)
There is no intrinsic connection between elementary propositions and the truth-functions obtained by the application of truth-operations on them, because to be an elementary proposition and to be a truthfunction are quite different things
Summary
This paper investigates Wittgenstein’s account of the relation between elementary and molecular propositions (and the propositions of logic) in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In the Notebooks entry on 5.11.14, quoted towards the end of section 1, Wittgenstein explicitly discusses the relation between an elementary proposition and its truth-functions by saying that the possibility of the latter is given as soon as the former is given.17 Elementary propositions’ T-F articulation (given by their being pictures of reality) makes them suitable for being logically
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