Language and African-American Culture

Abstract

Debates over language in recent philosophy have not thematized competing theories but dramatized them, as we see in Gadamer/Derrida encounter. 1 Theorists in these debates are so committed to a single ontology that they either squeeze out meta-critical space altogether or they refuse to thematize ontological commitments in their meta-critiques. Jurgen Habermas is an example of latter, while poststructuralism exemplifies former. What binds both sides together is assumption that function of meta-discourse is to articulate the validity criteria for every first-order discourse.2 Meta-theoretical reflection is not tied to this assumption; instead, relationship of meta-theory to firstorder discourse can be conceived of dialogically. Such a dialogue can provide a means to thematize competing linguistic ontologies in space of critique and utopia, a space that both Habermas and poststructuralists drive out. My goal in this essay is to clarify stakes of debate on language by examining influential work of Henry Louis Gates. In The Signifying Monkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), he brings African and African-American ideas on language together with those of Mikhail Bakthin and Jacques Derrida. Admirable as this study is for its rich synthesis of diverse sources, its theoretical confusions and contradictions-e.g., it does not bring out incompatibility of Derrida's ontology of sign with a tradition-based problematic for language-dramatize need for meta-philosophical reflection. This essay will begin with a brief characterization of linguistic dilemmas in contemporary philosophy and then use Gates' reading of Derrida as a point of departure for a discussion of how linguistic theories can serve African-American critic's needs for critique and recuperation, for ways of telling stories of oppression and stories of regeneration. will divide contemporary debate over language into two broad camps: third-person accounts, e.g., poststructuralist and Jamesonian ones, and first-person (and second-person) ones, such as Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, and Jurgen Habermas. In making this division, am placing debate in framework of explanation (third-person) versus understanding (first/second), even though poststructuralists replace explanation with ontologies of power. The ethical/political need to rethink opposition between these two views of language is put nicely by Nancy Fraser in her characterization of feminist theory: Either we limn structural constraints of gender so well that we deny women any agency or we portray women's agency so glowingly that power of subordination evaporates.3 In everyday conversation we employ both first and third person accounts. With our friends, we are attentive to language of self-constitution, but we also need to be aware of patterns that operate behind our friends' backs and that help deepen our understanding-e.g., cyclical ways someone talks about her mother. Sometimes we will challenge our friends' language of constitution-e.g., when we cannot endure way they are hurting us or themselves. In this case, we will suggest a third-person description directly or indirectly, I think you need to ask yourself why you keep falling in love with people who mistreat In other words, what (thirdperson) forces are pushing you? Third-person accounts redescribe axiological vocabularies of self-understanding so that subjectivity becomes an effect.4 However, these third-person accounts are not views from nowhere; they ultimately appeal to a revised ethical self-understanding in which we can live. That is, effects are appropriated by a new first/second person vocabulary. If we move back and forth between thinking of subject as constructing and constructed in everyday life, we often do not do so in theoretical discussions. One of reasons is that pains that interest theory are not usually accessible to dialogue with friends or therapists. …