Abstract

ABSTRACT De facto states represent an anomalous sovereign condition. Their parent states are unable to regain control over the territory that de facto states possess, while the de facto states are unable to secure widespread recognition of their self-determination claims without the consent of their parent states. Kosovo and Serbia have recently entertained the idea of making territorial adjustments through which a settlement between the two parties can be reached. Regardless of whether or not such an agreement will be achieved, this paper probes if and the extent to which agreements for territorial adjustments can end the anomalous sovereign condition of de facto states. To do so, it develops a novel analytical framework, employs two case studies, and analyses how crucial and supplementary conditions may jointly interact to (dis)allow possible ‘land for peace’ agreements. The paper finds that the likelihood of territorial compromises remains low because the peaceful reconciliation does not outweigh the tangible and intangible values of the territory.

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