Abstract

Land in Timor-Leste had been a subject of national importance even before the government first announced a planned petroleum infrastructure ‘mega-project’ in 2009, the ‘Tasi Mane’ project, on the country’s south coast in Suai, Betano and Beaco. This project has brought again into sharp relief the question of land and its control. Much recent work has focussed on ‘land grabs’ or how foreign capital and the state have played a significant role in dispossessing smallholders of arable land in other settings. This paper highlights three aspects which are inherent in the process of control. First, authority lies at the heart of land control alongside political-economic factors that lead to relocation of residents from land in project areas. Second, problems of recognition of land rights in project areas have led to more strident claims to authority locally. This issue I demonstrate by showing the historical legacy of two communities that occupy Beaco land. Third, the case study of the two communities sheds light on the social relations inherent in local property relations and subsequent disputes catalysed by contests over land control.

Highlights

  • Authority lies at the heart of land control alongside political-economic factors that lead to relocation of residents from land in project areas

  • This article elaborates on an argument that land control requires consideration of economic and non-economic factors in the context of a petroleum infrastructure project in Timor-Leste

  • Section two discusses recent theoretical approaches to land dispossession by the state or foreign capital, and argues that an analysis of land control is incomplete if not treated alongside questions of authority formation which often precede ‘land grabs’

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

This article elaborates on an argument that land control requires consideration of economic and non-economic factors (the latter including legal and social factors) in the context of a petroleum infrastructure project in Timor-Leste. The law does make two provisions for recognising “informal” title holding, which is based on continuous, long-term (of at least 20 years) undisputed possession (articles 15 & 16) This is problematic since the rationale for “creating” informal property ownership was to correct “injustices practiced before the independence of Timor-Leste [in 2002]” (preamble), referring, inter alia, to dispossession from land by the Indonesian authorities or another party. Such dispossession is only recognised as a legitimate reason for interrupting continuous possession after 31 December 1998 (article 17:2). I aim to incorporate into this process the local politics of claim-making to land and authority alongside the usual agents of land control, meaning the state or foreign capital

Land Control at the Intersection of Political Economy and Law
The Political Economy of Compensation and Changing Control Rights
CONTROL RIGHTS
Findings
CONCLUSION
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