LACS: A Lightweight Label-Based Access Control Scheme in IoT-Based 5G Caching Context

Abstract

Due to massive mobile terminal devices and ubiquitous communication, the Internet of things (IoT) has become an inevitable trend. Given that the fifth generation (5G) wireless networks expects to drive the proliferation of the IoT and may extend the access functions and systems of the IoT, it makes the IoT a vitally important part in future 5G wireless networks. Simultaneously, the limit of the bandwidth and power of the 5G would adversely affect the widespread promotion of the IoT. However, wireless caching techniques could remarkably resolve this issue. Recently, using fog nodes to improve the capacity of caching has become a trend in caching system. However, node-based caching systems may suffer from malicious access and destruction. To protect caching from sabotage and to further ensure its reliability, we propose a new lightweight label-based access control scheme (LACS) that authenticates the authorized fog nodes to ensure protection. Specifically, the LACS can authenticate the fog nodes by verifying the integrity of the shared files that are embedded label values, and only the authenticated fog nodes can access the caching service. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme is verifiable (the malicious fog node cannot cheat the caching server to pretend to be a legal node) and efficient in both computation and verification. Moreover, simulation experiments show that the LACS can reach the millisecond-level verification and it has a good accuracy.