Abstract

Marine cleaning interactions have been useful model systems for exploring evolutionary game theory and explaining the stability of mutualism. In the Indo-Pacific, cleaner organisms will occasionally “cheat” and remove live tissue, clients use partner control mechanisms to maintain cleaner honesty, and cleaners strategically increase service quality for predatory clients that can “punish” more severely. The extent to which reef communities in the Caribbean have evolved similar strategies for maintaining the stability of these symbioses is less clear. Here we study the strategic service provisioning in Pederson’s cleaner shrimp (Ancylomenes pedersoni) on Caribbean coral reefs. In the Gulf of Honduras, we use video observations to analyze >1000 cleaning interactions and record >850 incidents of cheating. We demonstrate that A. pedersoni cheat frequently and do not vary their service quality based on client trophic position or cleaner shrimp group size. As a direct analog to the cleaner shrimp A. longicarpus in the Indo-Pacific, our study highlights that although cleaning interactions in both ocean basins are ecologically analogous and result in parasite removal, the strategic behaviors that mediate these interactions have evolved independently in cleaner shrimps.

Highlights

  • The evolution and stability of intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism have long fascinated evolutionary biologists, and are generally explained by one of two classic scenarios: (i) helping is the by-product of a self-serving act, or (ii) there is concerted investment by both partners that yields future fitness benefits

  • A total of 1028 A. pedersoni-only cleaning interactions were recorded across all reef sites: Utila = 344, Cayos Cochinos = 349, and Banco Capiro = 335

  • We demonstrate that Pederson’s cleaner shrimp, Ancylomenes pedersoni, do not vary their service quality in the Gulf of Honduras based on cleaner group size, the trophic position of the client reef fish, reef site, or time of day in the hypothesized directions

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Summary

Introduction

The evolution and stability of intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism (terms we use as defined by1–4) have long fascinated evolutionary biologists, and are generally explained by one of two classic scenarios: (i) helping is the by-product of a self-serving act, or (ii) there is concerted investment by both partners that yields future fitness benefits (reviewed by[4]). Bshary et al.[6] developed a model that predicts two stable evolutionary strategies for this scenario: (i) service providers should cheat immediately to gain maximal fitness benefits leading to a complete breakdown in service quality, or (ii) service quality should be greater when provided in pairs, in an iterated game, than by single service providers. Some evidence exists that male cleaner gobies reduce cheating when cleaning in intraspecific pairs, but service quality remains high regardless of group size, in contrast to Indo-Pacific cleaner wrasse[8]. This perspective is needed to broaden the taxonomic scope of the cleaning literature and begin to synthesize behavioral patterns that have evolved across ocean basins

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