Abstract
ABSTRACT The instant runoff voting (IRV) method fails the monotonicity criterion. This means in an IRV election it is theoretically possible for a winning candidate to lose an election if certain ballots are changed to raise the otherwise winning candidate higher on the ballot. We analysed data from over 100 real-world IRV elections to ascertain if any demonstrated a monotonicity anomaly. Despite theoretical research indicating potentially high incidence of such voting anomalies, our investigations found only one election showing a monotonicity anomaly: the 2009 Burlington mayoral election. Burlington was also the only election resulting in different winners using IRV, Borda Count, and Pairwise Comparison voting methods.
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