Labour market inequality: a comparative political economy perspective

Abstract

Abstract Large and rising earnings and employment inequalities in countries such as the USA and the UK pose fundamental questions for social scientists and challenges for policymakers. Mainstream economists have explained these outcomes mainly in terms of competitive market forces, particularly the mismatch between technology-driven demands for skills and those supplied by workers. In contrast, political economy perspectives focus on employer–employee bargaining power, driven by the monopsony power of firms and declining institutional and policy protections for workers. We critically assess the evidence on the education wage premium and employment polarization used to support the competitive market explanation for US wage inequality. We then show that the incidence of decent pay for young less-educated workers varies sharply across similarly rich countries and that new indices of institutional bargaining power closely correspond to differences in pay distributions but are uncorrelated with conventional measures of employment performance. We conclude that well-designed institutional and policy changes can substantially promote shared growth and the well-being of working families.